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IMPLICATIONS OF THE TAx
REFORM PROPOSALS FOR
FRAUD
-ORHOW TO SHIFT To A
CONSUMPTION TAx
WITHOUT HELPING THE
CHEATERS

BY

KALYANI ROBBINS CONSIDERS THE IMPLICATIONS
THAT CURRENT TAX REFORM PROPOSALS HAVE

KALYANI ROBBINS

ON TAX COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT.

Introduction

'1999 K. Robbins

One need only spend a few minutes searching the Internet to be
overwhelmed by the intensity of
the tax reform debate. In addition to the discussions among
scholars and specialists, there are
more grass roots movements
than one could possibly count.
Some of them seem credible, often pushing for one of the proposals already being considered
by Congress, and others do nothing but scream so loudly against
the IRS that you can almost hear
them through cyberspace. Organizations with names like Ameri-

cans for Fair Taxation, 1 Americans for Tax Reform,2 Citizens
for an Alternative Tax System,3
Citizens for Tax Justice' and the
Great American Taxpayer's Revolution' litter the Web, calling for
a better way but only rarely explaining in much detail just what
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that way should be. The one
thing everyone does seem to
agree upon, scholars and angry
citizens alike, is that the time has
come to "[shift] from the question of whether to alter our current tax system to the question
of how to alter it."6 Given the
strength of this mandate, it is
worth taking a moment to consider the ramifications of reform
for tax cheating.
The vast majority of the proposals on the table today are simply different implementation
mechanisms of the same basic
idea: a change in the tax base
from income to consumption.
The purpose of this article is to
consider the implications some
of these proposals have for the
enforcement of tax compliance
(prevention of cheating). For this
reason, it will only briefly address
the impetus for a consumption
tax and the policy considerations
behind it.7 The first part will also
give short descriptions of the proposals that will be considered in
this article: the National Retail
Sales Tax, the Savings-Exempt
Income Tax and the Value-Added
Tax (VAT). Next, I will analyze
each of these proposals with regard to the feasibility of evasion.
Finally, the article concludes that
with regard to the prevention of
tax-cheating, the VAT is the most
efficient of these proposals. In
light of the fact that in most
other respects they are effectively
the same (they all tax the same
base at what would become the
same amount after determining
revenue needs and effectively operate to encourage saving and
boost the economy through investment), I would endorse a VAT
in order to discourage cheating
and to take the burden of compliance out of the hands of the
average citizen.

Taxing Consumption
What reason is there, that he
which laboureth much, and
sparing the fruits of his labor,
consumeth little, should be
charged more, than he that living idlely, getteth little, and
spendeth all he gets: Seeing
that one hath no more protection from the commonwealth than the other?8
Fairness to those who are capable of delayed gratification is
only one of the many reasons that
people in the United States are beginning to seriously consider a
move toward a consumption tax
(though it is key to distinguish between excessive consumption and
poverty conditions that cause
people to spend all of what they
earn-this can be taken into account through progressive rates
and standard deductions.) Another important consideration is
that just about every consumption
tax proposal, even the fairly complex VAT, is significantly easier to
report and collect than our current income tax and would therefore save time and money and increase productivity.' Perhaps most
importantly from a policy perspective, taxing consumption encourages saving. Under our
present system, which rewards immediate spending, the U.S. has
fallen behind almost every developed country in percent saved per
year.10 Not only will increased savings benefit future generations directly," but it will also provide
funds today that can be invested
in business and boost the
economy," which is good for all
generations.
One consumption based tax reform proposal is the National Retail Sales Tax. This is exactly what
it sounds like. Instead of taxing
income at all, a tax of at least 15-20

percent (some argue much more
would be necessary) would be levied on all retail purchases. "In order to tax only final consumption,
however, purchases by businesses
[would] be tax-exempt."13
Only retail businesses would be
responsible for reporting and paying the taxes they had collected, and
they would be reimbursed for the
added effort. These taxpayers would
remit the federal tax money to the
states, as they already do with state
sales tax in most states. The states
in turn would send it to the federal
government, less a one percent fee
for their trouble. In total, far fewer
individuals and entities would be
14
involved than with an income tax,
which would reduce the aggregate
cost of compliance. Regressivity
would be avoided through across
the board refunds in an amount
determined to be representative of
the cost of basic needs.
Another way to tax only consumption and leave investment income alone is the Savings-Exempt
Income Tax. Under this system,
taxes would still be collected from
individuals, eliminating some of
the efficiency benefits available
with the sales tax. It would, however, still provide the previously
discussed policy benefit of encouraging saving by deducting the
amount newly saved in a given year
from total income, effectively taxing only that which is spent. This
method can also be more reliable
than a sales tax by accurately determining the figure expended on
all consumption, not just the
spending that fits into the retail
sales (or other easily tracked transfers such as those of homes and
automobiles) model. Progressivity
would be attained through very
large standard deductions, and in
some proposals, graduated rates. 5
Naturally, in order to make this
system feasible, the tax rates would
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still have to be higher on average
than they are now to make up for
the smaller tax base.
Finally, there is the method used
in many other countries, known
as the Value-Added Tax (VAT). The
VAT is a bit more complicated than
the other two systems discussed
herein, but is essentially a multilevel sales tax, charged to providers rather than buyers (which basic economic theory tells us is effectively the same thing). Goods
and services generally go through
several stages (and pass through
several sets of hands) before reaching the final purchaser. A VAT does
not involve charging the tax directly to the consumer, though he
or she will pay for it through
higher prices. Rather, it is a tax on
the difference in value between the
goods purchased for each stage of
production, and the thing produced at that stage. A company
would be taxed on its gross revenues less the amount it spends on
supplies (but not wages). This figure represents the value that a given
company has added to those goods
as they move along the chain of
production, hence the name of the
tax. In effect, the value of the final retail product is taxed, with
each business that contributed to
its final value paying in proportion
to the portion of that value it contributed.
Because a VAT taxes consumers
by increasing the prices of the
goods they purchase, it does not
lend itself well to progressivity. All
consumers would have to pay the
same higher prices for what they
buy, regardless of their income levels. Although politically difficult,
there are some ways to deal with
this problem. One would be to tax
different production chains at different levels, depending on
whether the goods produced are
deemed necessities or luxuries.

nesses under-reporting their sales
This determination, however, is
highly subjective. Another way
to evade taxes. This would continue and possibly increase, as the
would be to give monthly checks
to low-income individuals in an
rewards of such tactics would be
higher when the taxes they pay
amount that reflects the tax they
are likely to be paying on their
are no longer diminished by including individual income taxes
necessities. Finally, we could give
in the overall revenue pool. In
people with lower incomes special discount cards to use when
other words, all tax dollars will
pass through retailers' hands. This
making purchases. The retailers
would then submit copies of the
sort of cheating is one of the easireceipts from these discounts to
est to get away with, as there is
the government
for reimburseI WOULD ENDORSE A VAT IN ORDER TO
ment (or
DISCOURAGE CHEATING AND TO TAKE
even just
THE BURDEN OF COMPLIANCE OUT OF
deduct it
from the
THE HANDS OF THE AVERAGE CITIZEN.
tax they
pay, perhaps). Reno other source of information
gardless of the method used, if
for the government to cross-refany, there would still be one benerence with the retailer's reportefit that we do not have under our
ing. At least with an income tax,
present tax system: the wealthy
would no longer be able to avoid
if an individual does not report
paying their share of taxes
income, it is likely that the employer did. In contrast, with a
through manipulation of the provisions in the tax code. This may
sales tax the consumers would
offset the problems with making
exit the store and have at that
a VAT progressive.
point completed their role in the
process. We would depend almost entirely (and for the entire
Possible Evasion
tax revenue) on the retailers to
Tactics for Each
accurately report their sales and
submit the tax dollars to the
Proposal
states. Add to that the complexity of policy-related differential
NATIONAL RETAIL
taxation levels for different sorts
SALES TAX
of goods, 16 and the fact that
While a move to sales tax would
some goods are sold both to final consumers and to other busimake it much more difficult for
nesses, and proper compliance
individuals to cheat and eliminate entirely the problems of false
becomes even more difficult, even
deductions and unreported infor the honest.
A sales tax can also be evaded
come, it would also invite a host
of new opportunities for cheaton the individual level. First,
ing. To realize this one need only
people could seek out "under the
look at the common phenomtable" sales, much like they do
enon, under existing law, of businow with employment. This
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would save them from paying the
(most likely quite large) sales tax,
and there would be an incentive
for sellers to participate in order to make more sales and perhaps charge a little bit more (but
still less than the price would
have been after the tax). Second,
consumers can avoid paying
what they feel to be an excessive
sales tax by purchasing higher
ticket items through the international market.17 Finally, people
could create phony businesses
through which to make their
purchases, which would then be
exempt from the sales tax.
Of course, some of these dangers could be avoided through
electronic means. Several proposals involve requiring that all purchases be made with "personal
smart cards," allowing the gov-

illegally selling goods for cash
in order to evade the tax. Another proposal involves something more like a typical ATM
card, to be used for most purchases, but with continued legal
use of cash for small expenditures. The government would review the consumer's checking account at the end of each month,
and directly withdraw tax on the
total ATM amount (card purchases plus cash withdrawals).' 9
This method does not suggest a
way to deal with credit card purchases, though. Under either of
these methods, most of the evasion techniques discussed above
would be impossible.
The fatal flaw in these electronic methods is that they are
overwhelmingly Orwellian. The
government would no longer
m e r e 1y
track a
person s
employTHE FATAL FLAW IN THESE ELECTRONIC
ment hisMETHODS IS THAT THEY ARE
tory, inOVERWHELMINGLY ORWELLIAN...
vestments
and those
THERE WOULD TRULY BE NO PRIVACY
purchases
LEFT AT ALL WITH REGARD TO AN
he chose
INDIVIDUAL'S LIFESTYLE CHOICES.
to claim
as itemized deductions
ernment to collect sales taxes di(which already leaves some
rectly from the consumer, at the
people feeling as though their
point of sale. One such proposal
privacy has been violated, espeinvolves a special card that also
cially during an audit). Big
contains data on the consumer's
Brother would observe everyincome level, allowing for a prowhere one went and everything
gressive sales tax rate. 8 Because
one purchased. There would
the card would be capable of imtruly be no privacy left at all
mediate funds transfer, the govwith regard to an individual's
ernment would be able to collect
lifestyle choices. Ironically, prithe tax electronically on the same
vacy is one of the many reasons
in-store device which would colsome people have supported a
lect the payment. This suggesnational sales tax in the first
tion, however, would do nothplace. 20 This level of invasion is
ing to prevent some people from
untenable, and besides, it is un-

likely that any workable electronic system could even be in
place within a reasonable number of years.
Finally, in addition to the
strong likelihood of cheating
under the National Retail Sales
Tax, the distribution of this cheating poses a greater risk to fairness
and to total revenue than under
other possible taxation regimes.
First, because the states will be
collecting and enforcing the tax,
it is likely that it will be enforced
differently in different parts of
the country. While there would
be a uniform federal requirement
of compliance, "[o]ne state's collection efforts or interpretation
of the federal law might be more
aggressive than that of another
state.""1 This could result in unfair variations in effective (postcheating) taxation levels in different states, which would not
correlate to their representation
in Congress. The second problem
is the sheer volume of tax dollars
that could be lost. When only one
single stage of production is taxed
(as opposed to a VAT), if just one
party (the retailer) cheats, the entire tax is lost, rather than merely
22
a portion of it.
SAVINGS-EXEMPT
INCOME TAx
Under a Savings-Exempt Income
Tax we would be faced with approximately the same potential
for fraud as under the current system, but with a few changes. The
problem of unreported income
would remain the same, and assuming we kept some of the currently available deductions, taxpayers would continue to lie
about those, but there would also
be an entirely new problem. With
an unlimited new deduction
(saved/invested money) comes
incentive to claim more of it than
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one really has. This could be done
by selling previously held assets
(the proceeds of which would not
be reported as income) and purchasing new ones (i.e. deductible
"new savings/investments") or
simply spending the proceeds (but
not paying the consumption tax
on that spending, as it does not
2
vanish from that year's income). 1
Even if this could somehow be
avoided by determining the exact
amount and whereabouts of
everyone's assets before each tax
year began (which would be exhausting), we would still have the
general problems of income tax
evasion.
VALUE-ADDED TAx

While no alteration of the method
of taxation could ever keep some
people from wanting to cheat on
their taxes, the beauty of a VAT is
that it makes it virtually impossible to do so. There would be no
income reporting and no separable tax charge on retail purchases. In fact, although the consumers would be effectively paying the tax through its reflection
in prices, they would seemingly
pay no tax at all, and therefore
have no way to withhold payment.
Because the actual taxpaying responsibility would be divided
among the various manufacturers
involved in any product, a VAT is
essentially self-enforcing. Each
producer will want to report the
amount spent on goods bought
from the company one step behind it in the chain, in order to
subtract that amount from the
proceeds of its later sale of the
goods to the next link in the
chain, which will report that
amount for the same reason. In
other words, each link in the
chain of production has incentive

place would be to elaborately coto police the one that comes beordinate it among all of the links
fore it. For a company in the
in a particular production
middle of the chain, there is pracchain.26 This would require the
tically no way to cheat.
consent of every entity involved,
Every production chain, howwhich is far too unlikely to adever, has an end. As discussed,
dress with any real concern.
there is nobody to police the retail seller. The customers make
their purchases and leave, and
Conclusion
without invasive methods, there
While there is no such thing as
is no way to cross-reference them.
a good tax, the best we can hope
The VAT, however, provides two
for is one that is less painful than
safeguards at the retail level that
the current system, and which
do not exist under the sales tax
can be more evenly applied
model. First, the penultimate
25
through the prevention of evatransaction has been recorded,
so there is
a record
of
the
NOT ONLY
quantity
WOULD A VAT BE LESS
of (let's
DIRECTLY B URDENSOME FOR MOST
say) widCITIZENS ... IT WOULD NEARLY
gets the
retailer
ELIMINATE CHEATING.
bought. If
the
retailer sells
sion. Not only would a VAT be
all of those widgets (as evidenced
less directly burdensome for
by its purchasing more of them),
most citizens, but for the reasons
it will be expected to report gross
discussed, it would nearly elimirevenues somewhere in the neighnate cheating. This would
borhood of their market value,
or at least in an amount suffiquickly lead to a reduction in the
cient to turn a net profit after
overall tax rate, as we would regain the fortune lost each year
the subtraction of likely other,
to fraud under our present sysnon-deductible overhead extem. This would make almost evpenses. Second, not only can the
eryone more content with the tax
retailer only slightly underpay its
system, and provide an additaxes because of these records,
tional boost to an economy albut that figure will be negligible
ready improved by the increase
in light of its diminished total
in savings discussed above.
tax responsibility (relative to a
Alexander Pope said "[wihoever
sales tax). Because the retailer
hopes a faultless tax to see, hopes
pays only one small portion of
what ne'er was, is not, and ne'er
the total tax, and can only cheat
shall be." 27 Truer words may
on a very tiny part of that, and
never have been spoken, but a
because there are no other potenVAT might be the closest we can
tial cheaters in the system, a VAT
is nearly cheat-proof. The only
come to attaining a livable, albeit imperfect, tax.
way for meaningful fraud to take
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